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Across the country, pretrial policies and practices
concerning the use of cash bail are in flux, but it is not readily
possible for members of the public to assess whether or how
those changes in policy and practice are affecting outcomes.
A range of actors affect the jail population, including: law
enforcement who make arrest decisions, magistrates and
judges who rule at hearings on pretrial conditions and may
modify such conditions, prosecutors and defense lawyers who
litigate at hearings, pretrial-service providers who assist in
evaluation and supervision of persons detained pretrial, and
the custodian of the jail who supervises facilities. In the
following Essay, we present the results of a case study in
Durham, North Carolina. We began this project in the fall of
2018 by scraping data portraying daily pretrial conditions set
for individuals in the Durham County Jail. The data was
scraped from the Durham County Sheriff's Inmate
Population Search website and details the individual's name,
charges, bond type, bond amount, court docket number and
time served. Scraping was initiated on September 1, 2018,
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and continues to the present. Beginning in early 2019, the
judges and prosecutors in Durham, North Carolina,adopted
new bail policies, reflecting a shift in the pretrial detention
framework. This Essay provides a firsthand look into the
pretrial detention data following these substantive policy
changes. Our observations serve as a reflection on how the
changes in Durham reflect broader pretrialdetention reform
efforts. First, we observe that a dramatic decline in the jail
population followed the adoption of these policy changes.
Second, we find that the policy changes corresponded with
changes in aggregate conditions imposed pretrial. We
describe, however, why public data that simply reports initial
pretrial conditions cannot answer additional questions
concerning the jail population or outcomes for the released
population. Nor can this data fully answer questions
concerning which actors can be credited with the observed
changes. During a time in which jail populations are a
subject of pressing public concern, we have inadequate
information, even in jurisdictionswith publicjail websites, to
assess policy. We conclude by discussing the implications of
data limitationsfor efforts to reorient bail policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, pretrial policies and practices concerning the
use of cash bail are in flux.1 Increasingly, litigation has raised
1. See, e.g., Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 1098, 1113-20 (2019).
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constitutional challenges to bail policies. 2 In addition, researchers
have examined the costs of cash bail, including increasing factors
such as the likelihood and severity of a conviction and the likelihood
of reoffending. 3 Accordingly, jurisdictions have reconsidered cash
bail, adopted new policies prioritizing release on written promise or
unsecured bond, and used risk assessments to identify individuals
who pose a risk of nonappearance or reoffending. 4 COVID-19 added
to these challenges, with jails and prisons serving as the epicenter of
some of the largest outbreaks across the country. 5 In response, some
jails experienced reductions in populations of individuals detained,
while others experienced lengthier stays in the absence of trials, and
some became the subject of federal and state litigation seeking to
reduce the number of individuals potentially exposed to COVID-19.6
The mixed responses to a pressing public health crisis expose the
larger and longstanding problem that poor information exists with
which to evaluate the pretrial system. Indeed, calling it a system begs
the question whether pretrial decisions are systematic: which
government actors are responsible for pretrial policies resulting in
individuals being held before trial in jail? A range of actors affect the
population of people held pretrial, including: law enforcement who
make arrest decisions; magistrates and judges who rule at hearings

2.

See infra notes 38-39.

3. E.g., Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-TrialDetention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108
AM. ECON. REV. 201, 224-26 (2018); Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor PretrialDetention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 759-69,
787 (2017); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial
Detention, LAURA &JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 19-28 (2013).
4. See infra note 39.
5. German Lopez, Why US Jails and Prisons Became Coronavirus
Epicenters, Vox (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/22/21228146/
coronavirus -pandemic-j ails-prisons -epicenters. Regarding prison response to
COVID-19, see David Garrett, Media Coverage of State COVID-Related Prison
Releases/Policy, DUKE L. CTR. SC1. & JUST.
BLOG, (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://sites.law. duke. edu/csj -blog/2020/04/16/media-coverage-of-state-covidrelated-prison-releases-policy/.
6. For examples of jails reducing their population in response to COVID-19,
see Criminal Justice Responses to the Coronavirus Pandemic, PRISON POL'Y
INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html#releases (last
updated Nov. 26, 2020) (describing a 30 percent reduction in jail population in
jails in Los Angeles, California, and Maricopa County, Arizona, and a 40 percent
decline in Denver, Colorado). Litigation has come forward challenging jail
practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., An-Li Herring, Allegheny
County Jail Sued in Class-Action Lawsuit as First Inmate Tests Positive for
COVID-19, W.E.S.A. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.wesa.fm/post/allegheny-countyjail-sued-class-action-lawsuit-first-inmate-tests -positive-covid- 19#stream/0
(describing federal class action suit against Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
jail); Alexandra Kukulka, Lake County Jail Inmate Files Lawsuit Alleging
Mistreatment of Inmates' Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, CHI. TRIP. (Apr. 22,
2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/ct-ptb-bodnarlawsuit-st-0423-20200422-glftmf7t2fdlfofsptilxrymmq-story.html.
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on pretrial conditions and may modify those conditions; prosecutors
and defense lawyers who litigate at hearings; pretrial-service
providers who assist in evaluation and supervision of persons
detained pretrial; and custodians of the jail who supervise facilities.
The interests and practices of these actors may not be aligned. Which
of these relevant actors can affect policy change? It is often not
possible to readily examine that question based on publicly available
data. Indeed, it may not even be possible for actors within the
criminal system to obtain good answers to these questions, even
though they may have access to internal administrative data. Within
a jurisdiction, it may even be difficult to determine whether a pretrial
system is working to improve outcomes of interest, much less whether
actors are following the policies and goals that they adopted. 7
This Essay examines the challenges in the public assessment of
who is responsible for bail policy based on pretrial outcome data from
Durham, North Carolina. In addition, we provide a first look at data
scraped from the Durham County Sheriffs Office Inmate Population
Search ("Durham Sheriffs jail website"). 8 While the data permits
some insight into pretrial outcomes before and after these changes in
policy, other key questions remain unanswered.
As in many other jurisdictions, most courts in North Carolina
had, for decades, adopted bail schedules that set out, based on the
type of offense charged, cash bail amounts to be used as pretrial
conditions in criminal cases. 9 In 2019, those policies changed due to
community expressions of concern with the jail population, new bail
funds and advocacy groups, and newly elected officials who
campaigned against the use of cash bail.10 In the prior pretrial policy
dating back to 2009, the District Court in Durham, North Carolina,
adopted a bail schedule that assigned recommended secured bond
amounts for each level of offense." Beginning in early 2019, however,
the judges and then prosecutors in Durham, North Carolina, adopted
new policies concerning pretrial detention, release, and bail. On
February 28, 2019, the Fourteenth Judicial District, which consists of
7. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1117-18 (S.D. Tex.
2017) (finding that "Harris County does not track the comparative failure-toappear or new-criminal-activity rates of misdemeanor defendants released on
different types of bonds.")
8.
See Inmate Population Search, DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF.,
https://www. durhamsheriff.com/community/public-information/inmatepopulation-search (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
9. E.g., N.C. JUD. DIST. 8-B Loc. RULES BAIL & PRETRIAL RELEASE 13 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Delvin Davis, 3 Stats That Concern Me About Incarcerationin
Durham, HERALD SUN (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.heraldsun.com/opinion/
article 199563369.html; Mark Shultz, Durham Rally Decries IncarcerationRates,
Prison

Labor,

RALEIGH

NEWS

&

OBSERVER

(Aug.

11,

2016),

https://www.newsobserver. com/news/local/community/durhamnews/article95029777.html.
11. Fourteenth Jud. Dist., Policies Relating to Bail and Pretrial Release For
the Fourteenth Judicial District (2009) (on file with authors).
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Durham County, issued new policies relating to bail and pretrial
release. 12 The district court judges modified the preexisting bail
schedule in a number of respects and also stated that prosecution
recommendations would be considered. 13 Subsequently, the Durham
District Attorney's Office released in February 2019, and formally
announced on May 21, 2019, their adoption of a new policy based on
a presumption of pretrial liberty, while seeking unafforded bond and
resulting detention for dangerous offenders.1 4 The policy rejected any
bail schedule. 15 Accordingly, under these two new policies, both
prosecutors and defense lawyers can advocate for pretrial conditions,
but apart from a handful of charges for which detention is mandatory,
judges retain discretion to set conditions of release. 16
It is clear that the Durham jail population has steeply declined
during the time period, beginning in 2019, when these new policies
were adopted. 17 The average jail population had been over 600
individuals in 2007, and it had already fallen somewhat, to about 500,
by 2018.18 After the adoption of new policies in early 2019, it fell to
366.19 Still more recently, we note that Durham actors announced
that they took steps to release nonviolent detainees in response to
COVID-19.20 During this time, Durham County Detention Facility
staff tested positive for COVID-19, and one detention official died. 21
As a result, by mid-2020, the jail population fell again, to 334.22 By
late August, 2020, the jail population fell further, to 251.23
The aggregate numbers suggest important policy changes at
work; however, the question of who is responsible for these changes
and how well they are working is harder to examine, despite the fact
that, unlike many jurisdictions, the Durham jail population can be

12. Fourteenth Jud. Dist., In Re: Policies Relating to Bail and Pretrial
Release Policies for the Fourteenth Judicial District (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.nccourts. gov/assets/documents/local-rules-forms/doc0003522019022
8104156.pdfTJovsG8m.Ls084_nIPtQuRj5139IHwSH.
13. Id. at 8, 12.
14. Dist. Att'y's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., 16th Prosecutorial District
Internal Pretrial Release Policies (May 21, 2019), https://www.scribd.com/
document/411746062/Pretrial-Release-Policies-16th-Prosecutorial-District.
15. Id.
16. See supra notes 11-12.
17. Virginia Bridges & Tammy Grubb, Triangle Counties Releasing NonViolent JailInmates at GreatestRisk for Coronavirus,RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER
(Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/coronavirus/article241343
476.html.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Ben Leonard, DurhamJail Worker Died of COVID-19, but Sheriff's Office
Won't Discuss It, INDY WK., (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://indyweek.com/
news/ninth-street-journal/durham-j ail-worker-died-of-covid-19-but-sheriffsoffice-wont-discuss-it/.
22. Bridges & Grubb, supra note 17.
23.

DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF.,

supranote

8.
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viewed on a publicly accessible website. This is not just a local
problem. Data concerning the pretrial process in the U.S. are very
difficult to obtain at the local, state, or national level. As we will
describe, Durham, North Carolina, provides a microcosm of this
problem.
National data exists only through a federal survey,
conducted annually, of a sample of 950 jails. 24 State-level data is
wholly lacking, apart from basic information about jail capacity. 25
Local data often consists of information, at best, concerning jail
rosters and populations but not regarding how pretrial decisions were
reached, justified, and modified, as well as what outcomes resulted. 26
The lack of adequate jail data reflects a traditional low priority
placed on pretrial adjudication and the fact that the U.S. traditionally
did not have large populations of individuals detained pretrial. 27 Now
that the U.S. faces this problem, it is increasingly important to track
and understand that population, just as the U.S. tries to do so
regarding prison populations. Tracking the seven hundred thousand
plus individuals detained daily in jails in the U.S., over thirteen
million detained annually 28 and about 60 percent of whom are
individuals who have not been convicted of a crime, 29 is still more
urgent post-COVID-19. 30 We require far better pretrial data to fully
understand whether public health risks are involved, whether
individuals are detained too often due to inability to pay cash bail,
and whether magistrates and judges are consistent, or fair, or biased
in their decision-making. 31
We began this project in the fall of 2018 by scraping data from
the Durham Sheriff's jail website. 32 That website displays daily

24.
25.
26.

See infra note 99.
Id.
Id.

27.

NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED

STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 34-36 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds.,

2014).
28. Id. at 40 ("The short sentences and pretrial detention of the jail
population create a high turnover and vast numbers of admissions.").
29. See TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/

content/pub/pdf/jim 13st.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Anna Flagg & Joseph Neff, Why Jails Are So Important in the
Fight Against Coronavirus, MARSHALL PROJECT (March 31, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproj ect. org/2020/03/31/why-j ails-are-so-important-inthe-fight-against-coronavirus.
31. Regarding the need for cost-benefit analysis in pretrial decision-making
and outcomes, see Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2017) ("I argue that current bail practices fail to take into
account the private and social costs of pre-trial detention-notably, the loss of
freedom to defendants, the collateral consequences to defendants and their family
members, and the administrative costs to the state. Instead, bail practices
primarily reflect a concern with certain benefits of pre-trial detention, namely,
preventing flight and new crimes if defendants are released.").
32.

DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF.,

supranote

8.
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pretrial conditions set for people in the Durham County jail. It is
intended primarily to provide information to victims (and not to
permit systematic analysis of information regarding the pretrial or
jail population). 33 The Durham Sheriff's jail website displays the
individual's name, charges, bond type, bond amount, court docket
number, and time served. 34 Scraping was initiated on September 1,
2018, and continues to the present. The data analyzed here is current
through September 21, 2019. We scraped approximately 35,294
charges, which we collapsed into 9,000 pretrial incidents (each
incident may include more than one concurrent charge, grouped by
each individual). This analysis does not shed light on more recent
changes to Durham policy and practice in response to COVID-19.
Below, Part II provides an overview of North Carolina law
concerning bail and pretrial release. Next, Part III describes the
policy changes that have occurred in Durham, North Carolina. Part
IV turns to our empirical findings. Part V details the benefits and
challenges of using data scraped from publicly available jail websites.
Part VI concludes the implications of these findings for pretrial
reform efforts and discusses further efforts to better empirically study
pretrial policies and practices.

II. NORTH CAROLINA LAW ON BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE
A.

U.S. ConstitutionalRulings RegardingBail

The U.S. Constitution regulates bail and pretrial release, for
which multiple lines of constitutional rulings apply, including the
U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Bearden r. Georgia,35 concerning
equal protection and due process rights to not be punished based on
poverty,36 and United States r. Salerno,37 recognizing the
fundamental right to pretrial liberty. 38 Thus, as the Court put it in
Stack r. Boyle, 39 the "traditional right to freedom before conviction
permits the unhampered preparation of a defense and serves to
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this
right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." 40
"[T]ime spent in jail . . often means loss of a job; it disrupts family

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
36. Id. at 672-73.
37. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
38. Id. at 755 (describing pretrial detention as a "carefully limited exception"
to the "norm" of pretrial liberty); see also United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495
U.S. 711, 716 (1990); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J.
490, 504-507 (2017).
39. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
40. Id. at 4.
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life; and it enforces idleness." 4 1 Lower courts have increasingly
engaged with these constitutional questions to challenge cash bail
practices. 42 One such federal lawsuit is currently pending in
Alamance County, North Carolina. 43
B.

North CarolinaPretrialRules

Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution provides,
as does the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that
"excessive bail shall not be required." 44 A judge in North Carolina has
discretion in determining conditions for pretrial release in most
noncapital cases. 45 The forms of available pretrial release include: (1)
written promise, or release of the defendant on his written promise to
appear; 46 (2) unsecured bond, release of the defendant upon execution
of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the
judicial official; 47 (3) release to supervised custody, placing the person
in the custody of a designated person or organization; 48 (4) secured
bond, requiring execution of an appearance bond in a specified
amount by a cash deposit of the full amount of the bond or by a
mortgage; 49 and (5) electronic house arrest with secured bond. 50 The
judge must choose "at least" one of these pretrial release conditions. 51
In addition, a judge may release the defendant to the supervision of a
pretrial service agency. 52
41. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959YGR, 2018 WL 424362, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018) (finding that constitutional
considerations apply "with special force in the bail context, where fundamental
deprivations are at issue and arrestees are presumed innocent"); accord Walker
v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2018); ODonnell v. Harris
County, 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053,
1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("[Pretrial] imprisonment solely because of
indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally
permissible.").
43. Class Action Complaint, Allison v. Allen, No. 19-cv-1126 (M.D.N.C.
2019).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-533.
46. Id. § 15A-534(a)(1).
47. Id. § 15A-534(a)(2).
48. Id. § 15A-534(a)(3).
49. Id. § 15A-534(a)(4).
50. Id. § 15A-534(a). For an overview, see Criminal Cases, N.C. JUD.
BRANCH, https://www.nccourts.gov/help-topics/criminal-law/criminal-cases (last
visited Sept. 8, 2020).
51. § 15A-534(a); see Act of Aug. 28, 2009, ch. 547, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws
1476-78 (adding electronic house arrest as a pre-trial condition).
52. See § 15A-535(b); see also JOHN RUBIN ET. AL., NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER
MANUAL: VOL. 1 PRETRIAL 1-18 (2d ed. 2013) ("Defendants supervised by a pretrial
services program often do not have to post bond and may obtain release more
quickly than they otherwise could. Defendants may have to comply with various
conditions, such as reporting periodically to a pretrial services caseworker,
obtaining substance abuse treatment, etc.").
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After an arrest, police are obligated to take a defendant before a
magistrate "without unnecessary delay." 53 A magistrate will inform
the defendant of the charges and certain rights, as well as general
circumstances concerning pretrial release and bail. 54 The magistrate
has initial discretion to make a release and pretrial condition
decision; however, in felony cases or if the person is sent to the jail, 55
a separate hearing before a district judge occurs at a first
appearance. 56
At the first appearance, the district court judge (or potentially a
clerk of court) will review the pretrial status of the defendant and
appoint counsel. 57 North Carolina law then contains detailed rules
regarding bail, including exceptions and special procedures for
particular crimes. 58 Finally, the statutes list factors that judges must
consider, "on the basis of available information," when setting pretrial
conditions:
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
The weight of the evidence against the defendant;
The defendant's family ties, employment, financial
resources, character, and mental condition;
Whether the defendant is so intoxicated that he or she
Would be endangered if released without supervision;
The length of the defendant's residence in the
community;
The defendant's record of convictions;
The defendant's history of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings; and
Any other evidence relevant to pretrial release. 59

53. See § 15A-511(a)(1) ("A law-enforcement officer making an arrest with or
without a warrant must take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate as provided in G.S. 15A-501."); see also § 15A-501(2).
54. Id. § 15A-511(b).
55. A district judge does not automatically review a magistrate's
determination in a misdemeanor case. RUBIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 4
("Typically, at initial appearance the magistrate sets a trial date in district court,
which may be a week or more away.").
56. § 15A-521(b)(5) (alternatively, a defendant may be produced before the
district court judge for a probable cause hearing or for trial or held for another
specified purpose). In addition, for certain domestic violence crimes, only a judge
can determine conditions for release for the first forty-eight hours after arrest.
See § 15A-534.1; see also Criminal Cases, N.C. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.nccourts.gov/help-topics/criminal-law/criminal-cases
(last visited
Nov. 26, 2020).
57. §§ 15A-601-06.
58. Id. §§ 15A-531-43. See also State v. Labinski, 654 S.E.2d 740, 744 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that, subject to statutory exceptions, a noncapital
criminal defendant has a right to pretrial release under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

533).
59.

§ 15A-534(c).
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Thus, unless these findings are made, a judicial official must release
the defendant upon: (1) written promise to appear; (2) an unsecured
bond; or (3) a custody order.60
III. DURHAM POLICIES ON PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL

The Fourteenth Judicial District, which consists of Durham
County, includes criminal magistrate judges, district judges, and
superior court judges. Magistrates are nominated by the clerk of
court and are appointed by the senior resident superior court judge
for two- and then four-year terms. 6 1 District judges are elected for
four-year terms; such elections had been nonpartisan, but beginning
in 2017, such elections became partisan. 62 By statute, all district
courts in North Carolina must issue pretrial release policies for each
county in a given district.6 3 The chief resident superior court judge
and chief district judge set the bail policy in District Fourteen, which
provides guidelines for magistrates and district judges when they
make decisions regarding pretrial conditions. 64
The following presents three subparts. Subpart A describes the
preexisting 2009 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy.
Subpart B
describes the revised 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy. Lastly,
Subpart C describes the 2019 Durham District Attorney's Office
Policy, as well as Table 1, a side-by-side comparison of these three
policies.
A.

2009 Durham Judges'PretrialPolicy

The preexisting pretrial policy for the Fourteenth Judicial
District largely consisted of a bail schedule. 65 Cash bail approaches
toward pretrial release have been a comparatively recent
phenomenon in the U.S., dating back about a hundred years. 66 In
Durham, for offenses apart from A-level felonies (which have no bond
under North Carolina law), the policy recommended a cash bail

60. Id. § 15A-534(b) ("The judicial official in granting pretrial release must
impose condition (1), (2), or (3) in subsection (a) above unless he determines that
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as
required; will pose a danger of injury to any person; or is likely to result in
destruction of evidence, subornation of perjury, or intimidation of potential
witnesses.").
61. N.C. CONST. art IV, § 10; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-171.
62. N.C. CONST. art IV, § 10; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10; Act of Mar. 23, 2017,
ch. 3, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 72 (restoring partisan elections for North Carolina
superior and district courts).
63. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-535(a) (requiring that the senior resident superior
court judge, in consultation with chief district court judge or all district court
judges, must issue pretrial release policies for each county in judicial district).
64. See supra notes 11-12.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. Timothy R. Schnacke, A Brief History of Bail, 57 JUDGES' J. 4, 4 (2018).
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amount or a range of possible amounts. 67 Notably, the policy
recommended fairly high bond amounts, from $1,000-$1,500, for
misdemeanor cases. 68 Further, the bond amounts rapidly grew in size
as felonies became more serious. The policy never suggested that any
inquiry be made into a person's ability to pay any particular amount.
Nor did the policy discuss any presumption of pretrial liberty. The
copy of the policy provided included handwritten notes updating the
cash bail schedule, which apparently increased some of the dollar
amounts at some point in time. 69
B.

Revised 2019 Durham Judges'PretrialPolicy

On February 28, 2019, the Fourteenth Judicial District issued
new policies relating to bail and pretrial release. 70 In announcing the
new policy, Chief Resident Superior Judge Orlando Hudson explained
that it "deemphasizes" cash bond: "The use of cash bonds doesn't
protect the public because the mere fact that you have money doesn't
mean that you are not a dangerous person." 71
Upon the
announcement of the new guidelines, advocates in Durham
immediately protested that it did not go far enough; one local
organizer commented, "We want an end to cash bail and we want it
now." 72

The current 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy states that the
"primary purposes of a condition of pretrial release are reasonably to
assure (1) that the defendant will appear as required, and (2) the
safety of the community." 73
The policy creates a rebuttable
presumption against pretrial release for trafficking, gang activity, use
of a firearm, and methamphetamine offenses. 74 The policy also
includes a schedule of revised bond amounts. The schedule provided
new dollar ranges, with the lower end of the range reduced from prior
pretrial and bail policies in Durham; however, the higher end of the
range remained unchanged. The new policy notes that the "Court
takes notice that the District Attorney['s] Office for this District" has
a new assistant district attorney assigned to jail court, and judges
may "consider the State's motion and in appropriate cases modify the
release orders." 75 Finally, the new policy includes a checklist for
magistrates. 76 It is noteworthy that the 2019 Durham Judges'
67. See infra Table 1; see also Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 11.
68. See infra Table 1; see also Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 11.
69. See infra Table 1; see also Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 11.
70. Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 12.
71. Virginia Bridges, Durham Judges Set New Policy to Reduce the Use of
Cash Bail. Does it Go FarEnough?, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 1, 2019,
6:34 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article226984969.html.
72. Id.
73. Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 12, at 3.
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 13-14.
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Pretrial Policy does not contain all of the elements of the statute,
including consideration of "the weight of the evidence against the
defendant" or the "financial resources" of a defendant. As in the past,
these local policies do not fully reflect state law. 77
C.

2019 Durham DistrictAttorney's Office Policy

District Attorneys in North Carolina are elected in a partisan
election and serve four-year terms. 7 8 In January 2019, District
Attorney Satana Deberry took office as a newly-elected district
attorney for Durham County, having campaigned to reform bail's
effects on the poor and individuals with mental health needs. 79
Subsequent to the adoption of the 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial
Policy, the Durham District Attorney's Office released, in May 2019,
a new policy concerning their approach toward making pretrial
recommendations to judges.8 0 The policy begins by emphasizing that
North Carolina law "expressly favor[s] the policy that pretrial release
of the defendant should be effected under the three conditions that do
not depend upon the defendant's financial condition."81 The policy
notes that "[d]espite statutory limitations on the use of secured bonds,
the practice in this county has been to impose secured bonds in many
cases pursuant to a bond schedule which fails to consider the unique
circumstances of the individual and the individual's ability to pay the
secured bond." 82 Such practices "unjustly and disparately treat
defendants with limited financial means." 83 The policy also notes that
"[f]ollowing a predetermined bond schedule without considering
individual circumstances is contrary to federal and state law.
Secured bond should only be imposed in rare circumstances, and
when imposed, the judge must consider the individual's financial
circumstances." 84
Unlike the 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy, the 2019
District Attorney's Office Policy does not contain a bond schedule.
Instead, it states that "[f]or all felony offenses that do not involve the
use or threat of force against another person, the presumption at
initial or first appearance is release upon (1) a written promise to
appear or (2) a custody order." 85 The policy states that arrests should
generally not be sought for failures to appear, unless a trial date has
been set. Instead, generally, the prosecution should request that the
77.

See id. at 1.
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-106(c).
79. Deberry '94 Discusses Plans for Criminal Justice Reform in Durham,
DUKE LAW (Jan. 14, 2019), https://law.duke.edu/news/deberry-94-discusses-plancriminal-justice-reform-durham/.
80. Dist. Atty's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., supra note 14, at 1.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1-2.
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matter be reset with a new date. 86 In contrast, unattainable secured
bond, the policy states, should be reserved generally for persons with
Class E felonies or above. The policy explains:
Barring unusual circumstances, a prosecutor should only
request an unattainable secured bond pursuant to § 15A534(a)(4) where the defendant is (1) charged with a crime
involving the use or threatened use of force, (2) a substantial
probability exists that the defendant committed the crime, and
(3) clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that no
conditions of release are sufficient to protect the community
from the risk of physical injury to another person or to prevent
the destruction of evidence, subornation of perjury, or
intimidation of potential witnesses. 87

Table 1 below provides a comparison of each of the three Durham
policies just discussed. 88 We note that all of the policies share that
judges retain discretion concerning pretrial condition setting.
Second, while the new 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy sets
lower cash bail amounts, it also expands discretion for a number of
offenses by creating a broader range of cash amounts at the upper
end, even while reducing the lower end. 89
TABLE 1. THREE DURHAM PRETRIAL POLICIES COMPARED

Misdemeanors

2009 Judges'
Bail Policy

2019 Judges' Bail
Policy

2019 D.A. Pretrial
Policy

Class Al (DV)90 :
$1,500-$3,000
Class Al: $1,000$1,500
Class 1: $1000
Class 2: written
promise
Class 3: written

Class Al (DV): N/A
Class Al: $0-$1,000
Class 1: $0-$500
Class 2: $0-$250
Class 3: written
promise

Presumption of
release upon
written promise to
appear except in
certain cases
related to domestic
violence.

Class A: no bond
(unless judge sets)
Class B1: $50,000$1,000,000

Nonviolent felonies:
presumption of
release upon
written promise to

promise

Felonies

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Class A: no bond
Class B1:
$200,000$750,000

Id. at 3.
Id.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
Domestic violence ("DV").
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Class B2:
$150,000$600,000
Class C: $50,000$500,000
Class D: $35,000$250,000
Class E: $35,000$30,000
Class F: $15,000$20,000
Class G: $5,000
Class H: $2,500
Class I: $1,000

Class C:
$2,500,000
Class D:
$2,500,000
Class E: $500,000
Class F: $500,000
Class G: $250,000
Class H: $150,000

Drug

Trafficking

Violent felonies:
written promise to
appear or custody
order requiring
community

reporting.
Electronic
monitoring or
house arrest if less
restrictive
measures would
fail.

Class C: $200,000$1,000,000
Class D: $200,000$500,000
Class E: $50,000$200,000
Class F: $25,000$200,000
Class G: $25,000$100,000
Class H: $5,000$25,000

Not explicitly
mentioned.

Probation violation:
variable
Fugitive warrant:
no bond
Governor's warrant:
no bond
Interstate compact:
no bond
Parole warrant: no

Criticizes use of
predetermined bail
schedule. Secured
bonds should only
be imposed if
written promise,
unsecured bond, or
custody order will
not reasonably
assure defendant's
appearance, result
in injury to a
person, or result in
destruction of
evidence or witness

I

I

Factors

appear or custody
order. Unsecured
bond only with
evidence and
ability to pay.

4.

4

4

Other

Class B2: $25,000$500,000
Class C: $15,000$250,000
Class D: $10,000$150,000
Class E: $5,000$25,000
Class F: $2,500$10,000
Class G: $1,000$7,500
Class H: $0-$5,000
Class I: $0-$1,000
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Fel. w/ Firearm:
$25,000 added
Mis. w/ Firearm:
$2,500 added
Habitual Felon:
$500,000 added
Violent Habitual
Felon: $750,000
added
Mis. Probation
Violation: variable
$3,000 (min); $500
(absconders)
Fel. Probation
Violation: variable,

bond
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intimidation.

&

FINDINGS

In this Part, we detail our empirical investigation of Durham bail
practices, emphasizing the limitations of the data that we
examined. 9 1 Subpart A begins by explaining the Durham Sheriffs jail
website and how our web scraper collected data. Subpart B describes
the variables we collected, other sources of data we were able to link,
and how these data were cleaned and processed for analysis. Finally,
Subpart C describes our research questions and bail conditions in
Durham.
A.

Data Scraping

The Durham Sheriffs Office maintains an online inmate
population search that displays the current inmate population of the
Durham Jail. 92 The Durham Sheriffs jail website permits individuals
to be notified of changes made to any individual's pretrial status
through Victim Information and Notification Everyday ("VINE"), a
commercial provider that maintains the website as a source of
information to victims. 93 Over a dozen other jurisdictions in North
Carolina maintain inmate population websites. 94 Typically these
jurisdictions are larger than Durham and may use different service
providers. 95 However, the information available is largely similar. 96
Other local jails do the same across the country. 97 There is no
statewide jail data resource in North Carolina, nor does such data
exist in a uniform manner in any state in the U.S.98 Studies of
91. Data scraper created by Sean Chen of the Duke Law Library. Data on
file with authors. Information about pretrial conditions is made public on the
Durham County Sheriffs Office Inmate Population Search (Durham Sheriffs jail
website).
92. DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF., supranote 8.
93. Id.; see also VINE, https://www.vinelink.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2020)
("VINE is the nation's most reliable and confidential source for updated custody
status and criminal case information.").
94. Many of the other North Carolina jurisdictions use a Peer to Peer ("P2P")
provider to maintain jail websites. See, e.g., Inmate Inquiry, WAKE CNTY.
SHERIFF'S OFF., http://p2c.wakeso.net/jailinmates.aspx (last visited Nov. 26,
2020).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. E.g., David Eads, How (and Why) We're Collecting Cook County Jail
Data, PROPUBLICA (June 24, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.propublica.org/nerds/
how-and-why-collecting-cook-county-j ail-data.
98. In North Carolina, the only centrally collected data is a monthly report
of jail occupancy rates. See Jessica Smith, 2018 North CarolinaJail Occupancy
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nationwide jail populations have relied upon data from the Annual
Survey of Jails, a survey administered to about 950 local jails by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics since 1982.99
Using these various
sources, other studies have examined local jail data.10 0 Nevertheless,
the lack of comprehensive and uniform data sets remains a local,
state, and national problem for jail populations and pretrial decisionmaking.
Starting in September 2018, we used an automated program to
begin scraping the Durham Sheriffs jail website, a program that is
still ongoing. 10 1 The program ran, and continues to run, several times
a day to catch all updates to the website, which occur at least once in
the morning and once in the afternoon. The scraper collected and
entered into a database each defendant's name, date confined, date
charged, date released (if applicable), charge, bail type for each charge
amount, court docket number, and number of days in jail.1 0 2 We
scraped from the "Last 24 Hours" page, which listed information on
individuals held in the jail during the last day, even if they were
released.
We were able to capture information that may have
changed, such as changes in bail conditions or amounts, and release
date. For information that was identical between updates, no new
entry was recorded. If any of the variables changed (e.g., bail type
and amount charged) a new entry was recorded, allowing us to
observe when bail conditions changed.10 3
There are important limitations with these data, reflecting how
it is gathered and how it is designed. The Durham Sheriffs jail
website was designed for the purpose of victim notification in specific
cases, regarding individuals detained at the jail.10 4 As a result, it does
not display persons not detained in the jail. Thus, our data scraper,
collecting data from that website, is not capturing all pretrial
conditions in Durham, as people released or who receive unsecured
bail from the magistrate will, in most cases, not be confined in jail
and thus not be present on the scraper. The website does not reflect
To truly understand the pretrial population in
arrests either.
Rates, U.N.C. SCH. OF GOVT: N.C. CRIM. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:37 PM),
https://nccriminallaw. sog. unc. edu/2018-north-carolina-jail-occupancy-rates/.
99. Data Collection: Annual Survey of Jails (ASJ), BUREAU JUST. STAT,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=261 (last updated 2018). See,
e.g., Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Prisonand JailInmates at Midyear 1996,
BUREAU JUST. STAT., 1, 9 (Jan. 1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjimy

-

96.pdf; Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009
StatisticalTables, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 1 (Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.

100. See, e.g., MARY T. PHILLIPS & N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, PRETRIAL
DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1: NONFELONY CASES (2007); Heaton et al.,

supra note 3, at 733, 736 tbl.1.
101.

See DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF.,

102.
103.

See supra note 91.
See supra note 91

104.

DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF.,

supra note 8.

supranote

8.
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Durham, including those arrested but not detained, and those
released pretrial, one would need arrest data from law enforcement,
as well as data from magistrate's hearings. Nor does this website
permit a full examination of judicial discretion, where any analysis of
the jail website includes only cases already seen by a magistrate.1 0 5
Second, the Durham Sheriffs jail website does not contain more
detailed administrative information from the courts, as its fields are
fairly minimal.10 6 It does not necessarily explain why a person is no
longer in jail; it just notes the fact that a person is not there
anymore.1 0 7
Court officials, law enforcement officers, district
attorneys, and public defenders have access to an administrative
database, the Criminal Court Information System (CCIS"), which
includes far more complete information regarding pretrial conditions
and status of any given criminal defendant.108 Court clerks enter
information regarding pretrial conditions in that system, as well as
far more updated information beyond that contained in the Durham
Sheriffs jail website.10 9 To provide one example of a limitation of the
public-facing jail website, in most cases, one might assume that
someone who stops appearing in the scraped database is released
because they have made bail, but other causes are plausible as well,
such as transfer to another facility.110 We are able to observe when
bond types and amounts change at first appearances, but the jail
website may not perfectly capture all such cases.11 1 For example, we
cannot know from the jail website if a person's bail changed in such a
way that allowed them to be immediately released, such as when a
more affordable bond amount is set or the bond type is changed. We
can see if a person's bond changed in amount, but the person
remained in jail. 112 However, if a person is held in jail on a secured
bond and then released after first appearances, we cannot determine
if the person was released because they made bail, the bond amount
was decreased such that it became affordable, or if the secured bond
was changed to unsecured or released on recognizance.1 13
With each of these limitations in mind, we nevertheless sought
to learn what we could from public jail data. To prepare our data for
analysis, we cleaned the database constructed by the scraper,
collapsing information from September 2018 to September 2019 into

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108.

N.C. JUD. BRANCH,

CRIMINAL COURT INFORMATION

SYSTEM

(2017),

https://www.nccourts. gov/assets/documents/publications/TechnologyCCIS_CC_
Facts.pdfRM548ZmTKsOJbpOdsPjvYOxopMr.vyc (providing statistics as of
July 30, 2017).
109. Id.
110. DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF., supra note 8.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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a single arrest "Incident."114
These incidents were unique by
defendant name and confinement date combinations.
We used
confinement date because, in some cases, the charge date for specific
charges varied by a day or two but seemed connected to the incident
that led to the arrest. We also isolated the "most serious" charge for
each incident for analysis, which we defined as the charge carrying
the highest (and usually only) bond amount. We observed that for
nearly every person detained in jail with multiple charges, only one
charge would have a bond amount. All others would have an amount
of $0.00, despite all having the same bond type. 115 For example, a
person detained could have an "Assault on a Female" charge for
$1,500.00 secured bond and a Driving While License Revoked (Not
Impaired) charge for $0.00 secured bond. Finally, we categorized
every charge into one of the following categories: special victims' unit
("SVU"), homicide/violent crime, domestic violence ("DV"), drugs and
property, traffic, failure to appear ("FTA"), or other. 116 We also noted
whether the list of charges contained any FTA, regardless of whether
it was the most serious charge. 117 In addition to the data captured by
the scraper, we also identified and recorded the name of the judge
who set bond for each incident by matching judge schedules for the
first appearance to the date the person was confined. 118 Because only
one judge presides in first appearance court per day, and first
appearances are held the business day after a person is confined, we
believe that we can match the dates with a reasonable amount of
confidence. 119
Thus, analyses were conducted primarily at an "incident" level,
and we were able to consider both case- and non-case-related factors.
Case-related factors include the total bond amount and type, the most
serious charge category, the number of concurrent charges, and
presence of an FTA. Non-case-related factors are defendant age,
gender, race, and the identity of the judge setting bond. We also chose
to not analyze some incidents due to possible issues with data
accuracy (see Part IV for more information). Namely, we do not
analyze 3,406 charges that were superior court cases, and 6,437
charges that had "N/A" listed as the bond condition. 120 In total, this
leaves 6,819 bail sentencing incidents for analysis. 121

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra note 91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Research Questions

Despite the important limitations of the publicly available data
on the jail population, we were able to observe some general features
of the bail conditions of the Durham jail population and how different
case-related and non-case-related factors affect bond type and
amounts. Our first goal was to provide descriptive observations of the
bond conditions for those in the Durham jail, including who is being
held, for how long, and under what types and amounts of bail. For
our second goal, we used time series regressions to assess the impact
of the two 2019 policy changes on bail practices. In the Subpart that
follows, we present analyses aimed at describing and quantifying
these relationships, addressing the following research questions:
1. Describe the types and amounts of bail conditions for the jail
population.

2. How many people are remaining in jail on secured bond, and
how many people are remaining in jail on "affordable" or low
bond amounts?
3. How do bond types and amounts differ based on case factors
(e.g., crime type, number of charges, and presence of an FTA)?
4. How often do bond types and amounts change?
C.

Findings & Results

Before presenting the analysis, we first provide some context on
the Durham County Jail. Figure 1, below, presents monthly jail
occupancy counts between 2016 and 2019. As you can see, the jail
population has fallen substantially since 2016. In 2016, the average
monthly occupancy for the jails was 487 individuals. In 2019, the
average monthly occupancy was only 428 individuals. 122
After cleaning the dataset, we are left with a total of 6,819 unique
bail sentencing incidents between September 1, 2018, and September
31, 2019.123 Here, a bail "incident" is a set of all concurrent charges
grouped by date and person. This means that a given incident in our
dataset can contain multiple charges. 124 In fact, our data has 4.39
charges per incident: 7.5 percent of these incidents had no bond set,
0.7 percent had a written promise, 2.1 percent had cash bond, 0.8
percent had the defendant released on custody, 71.6 percent set
unsecured bond, and 17.3 percent set a secured bond. 125 The average
bail amount across these incidents was $47,629, and the median bail

122.
123.
124.
125.

See infra Figure 1.
See supra note 91.

Id.
Id.
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amount was $3,000.126 There is substantial variation in bail amounts
across bond type. Unsecured bond bail amounts were on average set
at $8,096.59, while secured bonds had average bail amounts of
$64,434.71. That variation also continues across offense type. 12 7
FIGURE 1. JAIL POPULATION COUNT IN DURHAM COUNTY (2016-2019)

Monthly Jail Population Counts in Durham County From 2016 through 2019
Eo

E

Year

These 6,819 sentencing incidents represent only a fraction of all
cases in Durham during this same time span. Between September 1,
2018, and July 31 2019, there were a total of 15,081 charging
incidents. Only 5,655 (37.6 percent) of those 15,081 incidents appear
in our dataset. This means that a majority of charged individuals are
released by the magistrate and not detained pretrial either because
of the magistrate's decision in the case or the arrest did not permit for

bail.
Table 2 presents the number of incidents associated with each
offense type and provides additional information on bail amounts. 12 8
In total, sex offenses and violent crimes have the largest average bail
amount, and traffic offenses and failure to appear offenses have the
smallest average bail amount. 12 9 Interestingly though, these effects
are driven by extremely high outlier cases, where bail is set in the

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See infra Table 2.
129. See infra Table 2.
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hundreds of thousands of dollars, or even millions.13 0 This is reflected
in the median bail amounts across offense type, where there is less
difference between offense types. 131
TABLE 2. OFFENSE TYPE AND BAIL AMOUNT

Offense

Count

Mean

Median

Traffic
Drugs/Property

447
1, 57

$2,823.91
$60,248.55

51,500.0(

$4,500.00

Failure to Appear

1,087

$15,475.64

S2,500.00

Sex Offenses

114

$173,200.70

$5,000.00

Violent

1,792

$62,813.39

$2,500.00

These data provide a clear picture of some general trends
regarding bail sentencing in Durham. But the unique aspect of this
case study is that we have data both before and after two explicit
changes to pretrial sentencing policies. This gives us leverage to
analyze trends in bail hearings associated with the policy change. On
March 1, 2019, judges changed their pretrial detention policies.132
The District Attorney's office in Durham adopted their pretrial policy
change in February 2019 and later announced the change in May of
2019.133 For the purposes of these analyses we treat the "reform" as
occurring on March 1, 2019, unless otherwise noted. Conclusions are
statistically and substantially unchanged when we treat the "reform"
date as occurring in February of 2019.
The two policy changes were generally observed to: (1) reduce the
rates of high, unattainable bond amounts for nonviolent offenses; (2)
lower the average cash bail amount; and (3) shift the bail types away
from secured bonds. 134 Table 3 presents the distribution of bail types
both before and after the March 1, 2019, judges' policy change. 135
TABLE

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

3.

BAIL TYPE PRE AND POSTREFORM

Type

Prereform %

No Bond

7.7% (235)

7.3% (277)

Promise

0.5% (15)

0.9% (33)

Cash

1.7% (53)

2.4% (90)

Custody

0.5% (16)

1.1% (41)

%

Postreform

See supra note 91.
See infra Table 2.
Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 12.
Dist. Atty's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., supra note 14, at 1.
Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supranote 12, at 1-4.
See infra Table 3.
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Secured

74.8% (2,277)

69.0% (2,605)

Unsecured

14.7% (450)

19.3% (727)

[Vol. 55

Note: Parentheses Presents Total Number of Cases in Cell

These data suggest that the policy change is associated with an
effect in the intended direction. After the policy change, the number
of sentencing incidents with unsecured bonds went up by 4.7
percent. 136 The rise in unsecured bond sentences came from a drop in
secured bonds by 5.8 percent. 137
This is in line with the
recommendations of the policy. 138
Figure 2 displays a scatterplot with the bail amounts for each
case across the full time series. 139 In addition, Figure 2 displays the
Loess regression line across the full time series. The dotted vertical
line designates the date where both the judge and district attorney
pretrial sentencing policy changes were implemented. To the left of
that dotted line is the prereform period, and to the right of that line
is the postjudge policy reform period. This figure can show us trends
in bail hearings. 140
We observe in these data downward trends regarding the
prereform bail amounts and postreform bail amounts.
Put
substantively, the mean bail bond amount before the first of the two
policy changes is $61,241.06, while the mean bail bond amount after
the first policy change is $36,640.15.141 This means that since the
reforms began, the mean bond amount has decreased by
$24,600.91.142 The median bail amount has also fallen by $1,000 in
the postreform period. 143 However, in a regression with fixed effects
for each date, a case being pre or postreform was not a statistically
significant predictor of bail amount. This is likely due to the
prereform trends in bail amount, which are
decreasing
monotonically. 144
These changes are also mirrored by an increase in the rate of
attainable bond amount. After conversations with the District
Attorney's Office, we define an attainable bond amount as anything
under $1,000, as these would require $100 or less up front to secure
release for the accused. 14 5 Before the 2019 reforms began, the percent
of sentencing incidents with a bail amount under $1,000 was 13.9

136.
137.
138.
(noting
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3; see also supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text
that secured bond should be reserved for rare circumstances).
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 2.
See supra note 91.
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percent. Postreform, the percent of sentencing incidents with a bail
amount under $1,000 is 15.7 percent. Postreform attainable bond
rates increased by 1.7 percent. 146 This change is in a direction
consistent with the recommendations of the bail policy.
FIGURE 2. MEAN BAIL AMOUNT PRE AND POSTREFORM

A concern might be that these differences in average bail amount,
bail type and affordable bail amounts are the product of something

other than the policy that changed between the pre and postreform
period. Two reasonable explanations may be that (1) different kinds
of cases are showing up before and after the reforms and (2) changes

in the judges occurred before and after the reforms. We can say that
these two concerns do not appear to be driving the changes over time
in bail amount or type. The distribution, seriousness, and amount of

charges per sentencing incident is not significantly different in the

pre and postreform period. 147 Between the pre and postreform period
two new judges were elected in Durham. That means two judges only
rule on bail hearings in the prereform period, and two judges only rule
on bail hearings in the postreform period. 14 8 However, in regression
models controlling for crime type and number of charges, we find that

146.

147.

Id.

See supra note 91.
See Sarah Willets, Durham Elects Reform-Minded Judges, Voting Out
Two DistrictIncumbents, INDY WK. (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:01 AM), https://indyweek.com
148.

/news/durham/durham-elects-reform-minded-judges-voting-out-two-district-c/
(reporting that two new judges peplaced two incumbent judges in November
2018); see also infra Table 4.
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there are no statistically significant differences in the bond type or
amount that judges set.
A related concern may be that the changes in bail policy could
lead to an increase in failure to appear charges. The logic of this
concern is that with greater use of attainable bond amounts and
unsecured bonds, more individuals will be released pretrial, and rates
of FTA would increase. We find no evidence in support of this
concern. In the prereform period, 20.16 percent of cases involve an
FTA, and in the postreform period only 20.04 percent of cases involve
an FTA, a negligible difference.149
Next, we analyze whether judges are ruling differently, or
complying differently, due to the policy changes in Durham. Across
our timeseries, we have judge data for 6,045 (87.75 percent) of the
6,891 bail sentencing incidents in our sample. 150 Among those 6,045
rulings are ten different judges. 151 Two judges appear only in the
prepolicy intervention period, while two other judges appear only in
the postpolicy intervention period. This is because two judges were
voted out of office during the 2018 elections that take place during
our time series. 152 Table 4, below, presents the total number of times
each bail type was issued by each judge across the entire
timeseries. 153 In the interest of keeping the identity anonymous for
analysis, we replaced judges' names with letters.
TABLE 4. JUDGE AND BAIL TYPE
Judge

No Bond

Promise

Cash

Custody

Secured

Unsecured

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

23
80
28
16
14
46
56
3
79
66

1
9
3
0
0
5
3
0
7
8

5
17
13
3
2
23
14
3
24
20

1
15
2
3
0
10
2
0
10
3

187
826
279
126
93
606
539
29
810
791

41
200
100
31
28
168
110
4
212
160

We find no evidence that judges are ruling in statistically
differentiable ways once we control for observable case level factors
like charge level and number of concurrent charges. 154 Similarly,

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra note 91.
See supra note 91.
See supra note 91.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
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among the six judges present in the entire data set, we find that their
behavior was not significantly different from one another, both before
and after the policy change. In general, there do not appear to be
substantial differences between judges in their behavior across our
sample. 155
Lastly, these effects and the shrinking Durham jail population do
not seem to be substantially related to changes in crime over time.
Figure 3 shows the number of daily arresting incidents in Durham
from September 2018 to July 2019. While there is a decrease in
number of daily arrests, this decrease is relatively small, going from
about 52 arrests a day in September of 2018 to about 44 arrests a day
in July of 2019. There is no corresponding decrease in the number of
bail incidents (decisions) in the same time span. Thus, while the
policies we examine here are likely not responsible for a decline, some
change in judge and district attorney decision-making is.
Ultimately, we find statistically small but apparent changes in
pretrial detention in Durham after the 2019 policy change. We find
that bail is more likely to be affordable, is lower on average, and is
more likely to be unsecured or not set at all in a given case. 156 These
findings are robust to some alternative theories that could explain
these results.
These findings suggest, however, that the 2019
Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy best reflects current practice. 157 In
contrast, the District Attorney's Office Policy focuses on alternatives
to secured bond for most offenses and setting unattainable bond to
detain individuals for the most serious offenses.158 Thus, if the 2019
District Attorney's Office Policy best reflects current practice, we
should see a bifurcated system, with far more pretrial release, and far
higher bond amounts for the most serious offenders.
Instead,
consistent with the 2019 Durham District Judges' Pretrial Policy
being largely reflective of current practice, we see lower cash bail
amounts, not a dramatic change in the use of unsecured bond. 159
However, we emphasize that since the public jail data reflects
initial conditions, we are missing information about subsequent
modifications in pretrial conditions that would reflect the 2019
District Attorney's Office Policy and interventions to alter conditions
in cases. We lack information about magistrates' release decisions,
which may have changed during this time period (although one might
then expect to see changes in composition of cases). We also lack
information about law enforcement arrest decisions during this
period. Nor could we go further to assess the costs and benefits of any
such change in pretrial policy. 160

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra Table 4.
See supra note 91.
See supra note 91.
Dist. Atty's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., supra note 14.
See supra Figure 2 and Table 4.
See supra note 91.
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V. SCRAPED DATA, USE, & TRANSPARENCY

The U.S. lacks reliable and accessible jail population data. Even
where jails do provide public information about populations, there are
important limitations to what one can observe based on these data.
To be sure, web scraping is rapidly becoming a popular way to collect
data from the criminal justice system, including from jails. For
example, journalists have collected data using web scraping to study
trends. 161 Publicly available jail data is available from at least one
thousand counties, and researchers have aggregated that data.162
Research projects have examined scraped data from courts, not jail
websites, in order to obtain more detailed administrative data
regarding pretrial outcomes in jurisdictions in which such court
information is similarly available online.16 3 Other researchers, of
course, have instead relied on administrative data, which if obtained,
can permit far more detailed analysis. 164

161.

Eads, supra note 97 ("At ProPublica Illinois, we've just restarted a data

collection project to get new information about what happens to inmates at one
of the country's largest and most notorious jails.").
162. Jail Data Initiative, Pus. SAFETY LAB, https://publicsafetylab.org/jaildata-initiative (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
163. See, e.g., Aurelie Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Bail, Jail and Pretrial
Misconduct:
The
Influence of Prosecutors 2
(June
22,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138.
164. See, e.g., Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from
Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 477-78 (2016); Yang, supra note
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In this Part, we discuss some lessons from our project regarding
Durham's jail data and draw conclusions about using scraped data for
academic and legal advocacy purposes.
We suggest that
administrative data may be a far more comprehensive source of
information than public data. Yet even administrative data may
share some of the same limitations in many jurisdictions, due to
underlying problems regarding the manner in which data is collected.
Beyond academic research, public defenders, community groups, and
advocacy groups may seek to rely on such information. We have
received a number of requests from such groups, often with the goal
of identifying detained individuals who could qualify for immediate
assistance. For some advocacy efforts, public jail data may prove
useful. However, far more comprehensive data is needed to more fully
examine the costs and benefits of changes in pretrial policy.
A.

Policy and Privacy Considerations

The data that is available on government jail websites are not
designed to answer many of the policy questions that researchers and
the public may have. 165 Jail websites designed to provide victim
information may not provide accurate information about court
processes that explain pretrial outcomes.
They do not permit
evaluation of upstream policies, such as arrest practices by law
enforcement, nor downstream consequences, such as court outcomes
or criminogenic effects of detention. They may provide a window that
would otherwise not be available, but any analysis of such data can
be misleading.
Transparency can also come with potential costs. Such data
raises privacy considerations. To be sure, police blotter and arrest
information are generally quite widely available in the U.S.,166
although the dissemination of criminal history information is
regulated at the state and federal level. 167 Jail websites themselves
may make arrest information publicly available online, which can
harm the reputations of individuals who have not been convicted of
any crime, and who in many cases will not be convicted of any crime.

31, at 1458; see also Dobbie, supra
note 3 at 1,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyang/files/dgybailfeb20l7.pdf
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22,511, 2016).
165. See generally, Noortje Marres & Esther Weltervrede,
Social? Issues in Live Social Research, 6 J. CULTURAL ECON.
(investigating the art of data scraping).
166.

See

Police Blotter,

REPS.

COMM.

FOR

FREEDOM

OF

n.2 (2017),
(citing Nat'l
Scraping the
313 (2013)
THE

PRESS,

https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-sections/2-police-blotter/
(last visited
Nov. 26, 2020).
167. See U.S. Dept. of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 767 (1989) ("Given this level of federal concern over centralized data bases,
the fact that most States deny the general public access to their criminal-history
summaries should not be surprising."); see generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE
ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015) (describing accessibility of criminal records).
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To be sure, state courts and statutes have held that such arrest and
jail roster information is of public record and can be made available
to the press and to the public. 168 Scraping that data may make it
usable and available to be linked with other information in ways that
could create further harm to individuals' privacy and reputation. In
our project, we reported only aggregate data and not information
about any individuals or their cases. Web scraping can also raise
other practical and policy issues. Doing so can violate terms of service
on a website, if such a site does not permit access in the manner that
the scraper operates. Scraping can create demands on a website. 169
A Cook County, Illinois, scraper apparently overwhelmed the website,
causing it to shut down and make data temporarily unavailable to the
public. 170
B.

Research Applications

Our original plan for the Durham jail data was to conduct more
detailed inferential statistical analyses to determine the effect of
policy changes on bail conditions and amounts. Sources of unknown
variance and ambiguity in our data, however, prevented us from
conducting such analyses because we had too few observations for
well-powered analyses and had little confidence in the randomness
and representativeness of the sample.
Detailed below, these
problems reflect issues with scraped data and present considerations
future researchers should be mindful of for academic research.
First, it was difficult for us to verify that the data on the jail
website was complete, up to date, and accurate.
In numerous
conversations with the Durham District Attorney's Office, the district
attorney would look up specific case numbers in the CCIS-district
attorney case management system.
For some cases, we found
inconsistencies in bail amounts, types, release dates, and release
conditions. Superior court cases (demarcated by "CRS" tags in case
files) were particularly problematic, both in our cross-referencing and
based on the district attorney's experience. Hence we decided to
exclude them from our reporting.
Second, we observed some irregularities in reporting on the jail
website that complicated our understanding of individual cases. For
one, many cases had bail conditions set to "N/A." In some cases, we
suspect "N/A" represented a special condition, such as a temporary

168. See Police Blotter, supra note 166; see, e.g., Florence Morning News v.
City of Florence, 218 S.E.2d 881, 883-84 (S. C. 1975). Regarding mugshot privacy,
see Detroit Free Press v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 829 F.3d 478, 483-85 (6th Cir. 2016)
(en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158; Gregory Nathaniel Wolfe, Note, Smile for
the Camera, the World Is Going to See thatMug: The Dilemma of PrivacyInterests
in Mug Shots, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 2227, 2246-49 (2013).
169. EADS, supra note 97 ("We follow the golden rule at ProPublica when we're
web scraping: 'Do unto other people's servers as you'd have them do unto yours."').
170. Id.
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hold related to domestic abuse charges, for which Durham requires a
two- to forty-eight-hour detainment. Yet, for some "N/A" cases, people
were held in jail for upwards of twenty days. We observed other
irregularities as well, such as cases in which the person was
categorized as "No Bond" but released, cases in which misdemeanors
had "No Bond" conditions, cases in which people were held in jail for
multiple days despite having "unsecured bond" conditions, and cases
where bond amounts were in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
There are plausible explanations for these irregularities. Indeed, our
contacts at the District Attorney's Office and Sheriffs Office
suggested some, such as defendants awaiting transfer to other
facilities, charges from other counties, or unresolved charges pending
from before our scraping, affecting bond conditions. We are confident
that on the aggregate, our data are reasonably accurate in reflecting
the situations of people held in the Durham jail over a year; because
of these irregularities, we are less confident about drawing
conclusions about individual-level analyses, where each case is an
observation.17 1 Additionally, even if we were to start cleaning our
data and excluding cases to try to limit such inaccuracies and
irregularities, we worry we would be nonrandomly pruning cases,
thereby interfering with the randomness of our sample, and further
limiting the generalizability of any conclusions we do draw.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that jail data are largely
inaccurate for all purposes or that they are not valuable to academic
research.
Jail roster information may be of sound and
straightforward use.
Some jurisdictions have invested in more
comprehensive and accurate jail data. We do argue that researchers
should proceed with caution when using such data, particularly
public-facing data. Researchers should verify with data providers
(such as court clerks, sheriffs, jails, and prosecutors) their
assumptions about the collected data, including completeness,
abbreviations, codes, data collection process, and posting procedures.
Researchers should also consider variations in departments'
interpretation of data fields, statutory definitions, and website
constructions, especially if comparing any two sources of data. In our
experience, there are different technological infrastructures for
hosting the data that may have more or fewer variables and different
definitions for those variables (e.g., "No Bond" means denied bond in
Durham; it may mean "Release" for other jails; in still other
jurisdictions "0" as a dollar amount for bond may mean one or the
other, or both).172 This presents challenges both of the technical sort,
such as setting up scrapers that function similarly for different
websites, and of the analytical sort, such as drawing valid
comparisons between different jurisdictions.

171.
172.

See supra note 91.
DURHAM CNTY. SHERIFF'S OFF., supra note 8.
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These challenges relate to a larger and more general problem
that pretrial systems have traditionally not been set up to collect
consistent and well-defined data. Unlike criminal conviction and
sentencing records, which must be maintained for public purposes,
pretrial conditions are not final judgments. They can be modified,
and they may reflect inputs from multiple decisionmakers. Those
decisionmakers may have different working definitions of variables
that they do code, and they code information during fast moving and
sometimes quite brief hearings. It is a persistent problem, for
example, that failures to appear in court, which can impact pretrial
conditions, may not be documented or understood in a consistent
way.1 73 Practices regarding pretrial services and supervision pretrial
may vary.1 74 Representation at pretrial hearings may also be
variable. 175
Nor is transparency, or even just the pretrial condition-setting
process, necessarily improved by visiting jail court in person. Court
observers in Durham, in 2019, attempted to document what was
discussed during pretrial proceedings and had real difficulty hearing
what was being said in that setting. The records of that court
watching program are extremely sparse. We are acquiring other
forms of data including more detailed jail data from the sheriff and
notes from the district attorney that detail first appearance hearings.
We are exploring whether we can analyze what recommendations
prosecutors make pretrial and whether judges follow them, by
examining additional records from the Durham District Attorney's
Office. In addition, we are exploring linking to court administrative
data to assess recidivism rates among the pretrial release population
in Durham. These further analyses can only be made possible
through remarkable cooperation by stakeholders in Durham County;
not all jurisdictions will collect or share these types of data.
In sum, our experience with web scraping Durham jail data had
considerable limitations for research purposes. The data gave us
insight into bail conditions over time but not a complete picture.
Specifically, it is difficult to rely on these data to draw conclusions
about incident and case level observations, thus limiting the
usefulness of these data in observing trends. The challenges and

173. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1118 (S.D. Tex. 2017)
(finding that "Harris County does not track the comparative failure-to-appear or
new-criminal-activity rates of misdemeanor defendants released on different
types of bonds[;]" however, "Harris County does keep and was able to produce,
data coded as 'bond forfeiture,' 'bond revocation,' and 'bond surrender.' But this
data is not consistently kept or recorded.").
174.

DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: PRETRIAL PRACTICES IN

TEXAS 42 (2017), https://ppri.tamu.edu/pretrial-practices/.
175. Rod V. Hissong & Gerald Wheeler, The Role of Private Legal
Representation and the Implicit Effect of Defendants' Demographic
Characteristics in Setting Bail and Obtaining Pretrial Release, 30 CRIM. JUST.
POL'Y REv. 708, 716-27 (2019).
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weaknesses of these data are certainly not new; indeed, researchers
dealing with archival criminal data frequently face these limitations.
However, given how easily one can set up a scraper and access these
websites, we think additional words of caution are appropriate.
C.

Policy and Advocacy Applications

To fully assess the impact of policy changes, and not just whether
policy changed pretrial condition setting, one would need to measure
outcomes in criminal cases, in recidivism, in court appearances, or
other measures of social welfare in the community, in order to better
assess costs and benefits. Early intervention regarding behavioral
health, for example, might occur before or at the time of arrest and
would not be captured by jail data. 176 Nor would downstream
consequences, such as conviction outcomes, be captured by jail
data. 177 Some research has attempted to address some of those larger
questions concerning the cost and the effectiveness of pretrial
approaches. 178

Data obtained just from a jail website is limited in its usefulness,
but nevertheless, it can have some benefits for advocacy. If just rough
trends in jail population or cash bail amounts is of interest to the
advocacy community, that information may be accessible through a
public website. The Vera Institute for Justice, for example, has made
available data from three hundred jurisdictions, which showed that
jail populations decreased 20 percent in the first few weeks of the
pandemic. 179 While not permitting detailed analysis, that aggregate
data provided a useful snapshot. Our Durham web scraper created
an easy-to-access screenshot of the jail population each day, capturing
a defendant's name, charges, bond type and amount, and how long
they have been in jail. For groups such as public defenders or
community bail funds that want to identify cases that meet certain
criteria (such as, say, less than $5,000 secured bond amounts, or
defendants held facing nonviolent offenses), these data would be
useful for helping them target cases in which they might assist.

176. For an overview, see The Sequential Intercept Model, SAMHSA,
https: //store. samhsa. gov/product/sequential-intercept-model-trifoldbrochure/PEP19-SIM-BROCHURE (last updated June 2019).
177. Heaton et al., supra note 3, at 734-35.
178. CARMICHAEL, supra note 174, at xiii-xvi. Regarding the challenges of
evaluating several key costs, see Yang, supra note 31, at 1406 ("For example,
there exists limited empirical evidence on how to quantify the loss of liberty
imposed by pre-trial detention. Nor does there exist any quantitative evidence
on the effects of pre-trial detention on deterrence more generally. In addition, I
do not discount the possibility that some costs and benefits may be difficult to
quantify, such as trust in, and legitimacy of, legal institutions.").
179. Christian Henrichson & Oliver Hinds, Use this Data to Hold Your Local
Jail Accountable During the Pandemic, VERA INST. OF JUST.: THINK JUST. BLOG
(April 8, 2020), https://www.vera.org/blog/covid-19-1/use-this-data-to-hold-yourlocal-j ail-accountable-during-the-pandemic.
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Recently, a more immediate and time-sensitive use of such data has
become relevant as well: identifying people in jail that could be
released during the COVID-19 pandemic. Identifying inmates who
are older, detained on low level charges, or fitting other criteria, may
be possible using web scraping.
If a jurisdiction sought to provide more comprehensive and
accessible data concerning pretrial policy and outcomes, it could
create a public-facing dashboard that displays visuals and data in a
manner that answers the key questions that the public might have.
Some jurisdictions have created such dashboards. Many display an
interactive version of basic booking and jail roster information, with
detailed fields and customizable displays. 180 Given the limitations of
jail roster information, it is worth considering what a more robust
pretrial dashboard would look like. Such a dashboard might include
booking information at arrest, information concerning magistrate
rulings on pretrial conditions, any further modifications by a judge,
and subsequent outcomes in cases (or even for individuals). 18 1 A more
comprehensive dashboard could include pretrial recommendations
submitted by prosecutors and defense attorneys. Researchers could
subsequently observe whether judges tend to follow one set of
recommendations more frequently. Additionally, such a dashboard
could enable the public to see which conditions are imposed pretrial
in any individual case while also providing for analysis of the
aggregate data-helping to understand why people are detained
pretrial, for how long, and under what circumstances. While more
rigorous study of the costs and benefits of outcomes under pretrial
policy would require far more data, such a data portal would permit
a far clearer understanding of pretrial policy in a given jurisdiction. 182
VI. CONCLUSION

Our investigation of bail conditions for people held in the Durham
jail are informative as to how new pretrial policies affect outcomes
over time.
We observe a notable decline in the Durham jail
180. See, e.g., Missoula County Jail Dashboard, MISSOULA CNTY.,
http s: //www. mis soulacounty. us/government/civil-criminal-justice/criminaljustice-coordinating-council/jail-dashboard (last visited Nov. 26, 2020); New York
City Jail Population, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://vera-institute.shinyapps.io/
nycjail population/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2020); Salt Lake County Jail
Dashboard,

SALT

LAKE

CITY

SHERIFF'S

OFF.,

http://slsheriff.org/page-jail_dashboard.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
181. For an example of a dashboard that includes arrest information, see
Justice Dashboard, S.F. DIST. ATT'Y , https://sfdistrictattorney.org/policy/justicedashboard/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2020) (measuring subsequent contact rates for
three years at arrest, arraignment, and conviction).
182. An extremely comprehensive public data collection effort is contemplated
under the Consent Decree in the Harris County misdemeanor bail litigation.
Consent Decree at 8, ODonnell et al v. Harris County, No. 16-cv-01414 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 21, 2019). We note that one of the authors, Professor Brandon L. Garrett,
presently serves as court-appointed monitor in that consent decree.
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population, from over 600 people to just over 250 people. During the
year following adoption of new policies in early 2019, we observe a
decrease in the average bond amounts over time and shifts away from
secured bail. We also observe a decline in average bail amounts
before the policy changes. While we observe an increase in unsecured
bond amounts after the changes, we also see an increase in no bond
incidents. Second and more broadly, we see significant variation in
the mean and median amount of bond amounts across bail types. It
is clear that judges view different crimes with different associated
risk. Whether or not these amounts are appropriate or fully reflect
the goals of recent policy changes, however, is less clear. The average
bond amount for traffic cases was nearly $1,500 (median $1,000).
Few bail bond companies will provide for amounts lower than $5,000,
meaning that the $1,500 may need to be paid by the defendant.1 83
We do not take a position on whether these new policies are a
success or are responsible for the steep decline in the jail population.
Such a position would require additional data and analysis. Further
changes in practice have occurred following COVID-19, resulting in a
deeper reduction in the jail population in 2020. We highlight here that
based on public data, we could not fully articulate which of the
overlapping policies is more consistently followed.
One reason why it was a challenge to examine that question is
because the new Durham policies are in some tension with each other,
and they each have different goals. 184 In Durham, North Carolina,
the 2019 District Attorney's Office Policy aims to release low level
offenders and detain serious offenders.1 85 To release offenders, they
must largely use the mechanism of low cash bail, although they may
also simply dismiss cases, or use pretrial diversion options. 186
Similarly, to detain serious offenders, they must largely use the
mechanism of cash bail, since pretrial detention is only available for
a limited number of offenses, such as capital offenses.1 87 As a result,
the policy focuses on alternatives to secured bond for most offenses
and setting unattainable bond to detain individuals for the most
serious offenses.188 If the 2019 District Attorney's Office Policy best
reflects current practice, we should see a bifurcated system, with far
more pretrial release, and far higher bond amounts for the most
serious offenders. As such, we might actually see a higher percentage
of bond as secured, but many fewer people in jail. That pattern would
be difficult to detect given the limitations of these data. Similarly, if
183. See supra Table 3; see generally Dorothy Weldon, More Appealing:
Reforming Bail Review in State Courts, 118 CoLUM. L. REv. 2401, 2402-03 (2018)
(proposing appellate review of determinations as a method for reform).
184. Compare Dist. Atty's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., supra note 14, with
Fourteenth Jud. Dist., supra note 12.
185. Dist. Atty's Off., Durham Cnty., N.C., supra note 14, at 1-2.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Id.
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the 2019 Durham Judges' Pretrial Policy were largely reflective of
current practice, then we might see lower cash bail amounts, but
largely the same composition of outcomes as before the change in
policy. Unsurprisingly, the interaction between these two policies is
complex. These competing policies make explicit what is often implicit
in pretrial adjudication: different actors have different policies,
practices, and goals, making it difficult to assess their respective roles
over time.
Further, bond is one piece of a puzzle that includes arrest
decisions, pretrial services, community organizations and advocacy,
fines and fees, and plea-bargaining, each of which feedback to arrest,
pretrial, and conviction outcomes. 189 Pretrial outcomes, as discussed,
reflect decision-making by a number of actors. For example, arrest
diversion could reduce arrests and the reliance on cash bail.
Alternatively, pretrial services and supervision could lessen the
reliance on cash bail. Jurisdictions, such as Durham, with strong
community interest in criminal justice reform can put pressure on
elected judges and prosecutors to change pretrial practices and
policies. A person's inability to make bail can negatively affect trial
outcomes and make them far more likely to plead guilty. 190 Jailtime
can affect healthcare coverage, behavioral health, employment,
housing, child custody, and so many other community outcomes. 191
Studying those broader costs and benefits is an important challenge.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this project, and any other
project that relies on jail roster data, is that we can only observe
people held in jail and not upstream policies (or downstream
consequences). We cannot observe people who are initially released
by a magistrate on recognizance, unsecured bond, or any other bail
decisions in Durham. As a result, we cannot definitively say how the
cases we do observe fit into an overall picture of what bond conditions
look like in Durham. As previously mentioned, we are unable to
observe why people are released from jail, who paid bail, or when a
bond condition is changed at a first appearance from secured to
unsecured or release. Nor can we observe downstream outcomes,
which are available only in court data, concerning subsequence
dismissal, conviction, sentencing, or other subsequent legal and social
outcomes. Thus, there is a real lack of transparency to the pretrial
process, despite the existence in many jurisdictions of jail websites
like the one that we scraped data from and some that convert such
data into visual dashboards. A seeming transparency disguises a real
lack of basic information concerning case processing pretrial.
Thus, understanding bail policy changes requires far more than
just observing the change in bond types and amounts. A more
189.
Affects
190.
191.

Megan T. Stevenson, Distortionof Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail
Case Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 514-16 (2018).
Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 512.
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complete evaluation must also consider how these changes interact
with other parts of the system, including the behavioral health
system, employment outcomes, housing, health care coverage, and
public benefits.1 92
Given the pressing need to reconsider jail
populations, including post-COVID-19, researchers should, and will,
continue to carefully evaluate the state of pretrial reform in the
growing number of jurisdictions nationwide that are reconsidering
pretrial practices.

192.

See, e.g., Dobbie, supranote 3, at 2.

